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This paper shows that outsourcing of parts of the workforce in unionized firms leads to wage 
moderation and as long as the share of the outsourced workforce is not too large, this wage-
moderation effect on domestic employment outweighs the direct substitution effect so that 
domestic employment increases in unionized firms as outsourcing costs fall. This does not 
affect the well-established qualitative results of the impact labour tax reforms have: changes 
in the wage tax rate, the tax exemption and the unemployment benefit payments affect 
domestic wage setting in the same way as in the absence of outsourcing. Furthermore, 
increasing the degree of tax progression by keeping the relative tax burden per worker 
constant continues to be good for employment. However, except for low outsourcing 
activities, the impact of these policy measures will become smaller as outsourcing costs fall. 
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1. Introduction 
Wage differences constitute a central explanation for the increasing dominant business 
practice of international outsourcing across a wide range of industries.
1 In high-wage 
countries with high unemployment rates due to labour market imperfections there are 
deep concerns about the adverse consequences of increasing outsourcing activities. 
Outsourcing, so the argument goes, threatens jobs in the home country because foreign 
jobs may replace domestic jobs. Indeed, there is a direct crowding out when domestic 
and foreign jobs are substitutes.
2 But this may not be the whole story. 
  When outsourcing and domestic labour are substitutes, the domestic labour 
demand is decreasing and the wage elasticity of domestic labour demand is increasing in 
the share of outsourcing (see e.g. Senses (2006) for empirical evidence). This limits the 
mark-up trade unions can set above the opportunity cost of labour. Our paper shows that 
this indirect positive wage moderation effect will be stronger than the direct substitution 
effect as long as outsourcing costs are not yet too low. Then, domestic employment in 
outsourcing unionized firms increases when economic integration leads to a further fall 
in outsourcing costs because the ease of outsourcing disciplines the firms’ unions. 
  Both substitution and wage moderation effects affect the efficacy of the 
government’s employment policy measures that aims at correcting the labour market 
failure. In the second part we analyze the consequences for domestic labour market 
policies, which, when direct controls are ruled out, are mainly restricted to changes of the 
labour tax system, by altering labour taxes and workers’ tax exemptions, or the social 
security system, in particular the generosity of the unemployment insurance scheme. For 
                                                 
1 See e.g. Sinn (2007) for an overview or Stefanova (2006) concerning the East-West dichotomy of 
outsourcing. Amiti and Wei (2005) as well as Rishi and Saxena (2004) emphasize the big difference in 
labour costs as the main explanation for the strong increase in outsourcing of both manufacturing and 
services to countries with low labour costs. 
2  Outsourcing may be beneficial for domestic jobs when foreign jobs are complements to domestic jobs. 
See Skaksen and Sörensen (2001) for a theoretical treatment and e.g. Leahy and Montagna (2000) for 
empirical evidence.   2
these policies we will analyze to which extent outsourcing limits the efficacy of labour 
tax reforms with respect to domestic employment in unionized firms that engage in 
outsourcing. This policy-relevant issue will be discussed for two different outsourcing 
scenarios. Firms may write long-term contracts that fix the amount of outsourcing before 
the trade union sets the wage – which we will call the case of strategic outsourcing – or 
alternatively, firms may be flexible enough to decide upon the amount of outsourcing 
activity simultaneously with domestic labour demand after the domestic wage is set by 
the trade union. We analyze how three isolated labour tax policy changes and one labour 
tax reform that all have proven as employment enhancing in the absence of outsourcing.
3 
It turns out that, when domestic labour and outsourcing are perfect substitutes, both the 
negative effects of a wage tax and generous unemployment benefit payments on 
domestic labour demand and the positive effect of a tax exemption for workers on labour 
demand prevail. However, for any given labour demand elasticity the magnitude of 
changes critically hinges on the share of outsourcing activities. If outsourcing occurs but 
still plays a minor role for the firm, the effect of domestic labour tax policies on domestic 
employment in unionized firms becomes stronger than in the absence of outsourcing. 
  We proceed as follows. Section 2 presents the basic structure of theoretical 
framework and lays out the time sequences of various decisions on labour demand and 
wage setting. In section 3 strategic outsourcing is presented and the effects of labour tax 
instruments and tax reforms are analyzed in section 4. Section 5 then analyzes the case of 
flexible outsourcing. The analytical results are illustrated by some numerical simulations 
in section 6. Finally, we present conclusions in section 7. 
2. Basic framework 
We first consider the case where the firm writes a long-term contract that fixes the 
amount of outsourcing before the trade union sets the wage. At stage 1, the government 
                                                 
3 See, e.g. Koskela and Vilmunen (1996), Koskela and Schöb (1999), (2002a), (2002b).   3
behaves as a Stackelberg leader and fixes the two labour tax parameters. To raise 
revenues, the government can employ a wage tax t, which is levied on the gross wage w, 
minus a tax exemption a. The tax base per worker for the wage tax t thus equals 
) ( a w− . In the presence of a positive tax exemption a, the marginal tax rate t exceeds 
the average tax rate  ) / 1 ( w a t −  so that the tax system is linearly progressive.
4 The net-of-
tax wage the worker receives is given by  ta w t w
n + − = ) 1 (.  
  At stage 2, the firm decides about how much of the workforce to outsource. The 
firm produces an output good with labour only, whereby, for analytical convenience, 
domestic labour L and foreign labour, i.e. outsourcing, M, are assumed to be perfect 
substitutes. To derive an explicit solution, we postulate the following decreasing returns-










) ( M L M L f ,    1 > δ . 
The price of the output good is normalized to unity. Profit is given by 
) ( ) ( M C wL M L f − − + = π , where 
2 5 . 0 ) ( cM M C =  is a convex cost of establishing 
capacity M for foreign outsourced production. 
At stage 3, the monopolistic firm-level trade union sets the gross wage.
5 It takes 
both the tax parameters and the outsourcing decision of the firm as given and anticipates 
the consequences that the wage setting will have for the domestic labour demand of its 
firm in stage 4. The time sequence of these decisions is summarized in Figure 1. The 
decisions at each stage are analyzed by using backward induction. The analysis of the 
case where domestic labour demand and outsourcing are decided simultaneously is 
delegated to section 6. 
                                                 
4  For a seminal paper about tax progression, see Musgrave and Thin (1948), and for another elaboration, 
see e.g. Lambert (2001, chapters 7-8). 
5  Since tax parameters are given from the viewpoint of firms and trade unions, it does not matter whether 
they bargain over gross or net-of-tax wages (see e.g. Koskela and Schöb 2002b).   4
Figure 1: Time sequence of decisions: strategic outsourcing 
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th stage: labour demand 
In the 4
th stage, firms hire domestic workers according to the first-order profit 
maximization condition, which is  w M L fL L − + = = π ) ( 0 . Using the production 
function (1) this leads to  
(2)  M w M w L − =
δ − ) , (.  
A more extensive outsourcing activity will cet. par. decrease domestic labour demand. 
This feature is fully consistent with empirical evidence.
6 Apart from the direct 
substitution effect  dM dL − = , there is  an additional indirect effect on domestic 
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where  ) ( M L M + = α  indicates the share of the workforce that is outsourced. In the 
absence of outsourcing this elasticity is constant,  δ = η
= α 0 . Domestic labour demand 
becomes the more elastic the larger the share of outsourcing is, i.e. we have 
0 ) 1 /( > α − η = ηα .
7 Furthermore, in the presence of outsourcing, domestic labour 
demand becomes sensitive to changes in the domestic labour cost, i.e the gross wage w: 
the elasticity reacts positively to the wage set by the trade union, i.e. we have (using 






                                                 
6  See e.g. Görg and Hanley (2005) and Hijzen et al. (2005). 
7  Senses (2006) recently provided empirical evidence according to which higher outsourcing increases the 
wage elasticity of labour demand. See also Hasan et al. (2007) and Slaughter (2001).   5
2.2 3
rd stage: wage setting 
Wages are determined by a firm-level monopoly trade union, which maximizes the sum 
of its N members’ income that consists of the net-of-tax wage income of employed 
member and some unemployment benefit payments b for those being unemployed. From 
the viewpoint of a small firm-level trade union b is exogenous. Denoting the objective 
function of the trade union by V, the maximization problem of the trade union is 
(4)  { b L N L ta t w V
w
) ( ) ) 1 ( ( max
) (
− + + − =     s.t.  M w L − =
δ − ,  
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The comparative statics – taking into account that (5) is only an implicit function as we 
know from substituting in the wage elasticity of labour demand (3) – shows first that 
outsourcing leads trade unions to moderate wages because the outsourcing activity M 
positively affects the elasticity of labour demand and thereby negatively the wage rate 
via the mark-up  ) 1 /( − η η :  0 < M w  (see Appendix 1). When the share of outsourcing 
increases, a wage increase benefits less domestic workers for any given number of wage-
induced lay-offs. It is thus beneficial for the trade union to lower the wage when 
outsourcing has increased exogenously.
8 
  The effects of wage tax and tax exemption changes on wage formation are 
qualitatively the same with and without outsourcing, i.e. we have  0 > t w  and  0 < a w , 
although the effects are smaller in absolute terms when the firm engages in outsourcing.  
                                                 
8  Egger and Egger (2003) study the impact of a decline in trade barriers on outsourcing of low-skilled 
labor and find empirical evidence that outsourcing decreases wages of low-skilled labor. See also 
Feenstra and Hanson (1999) and Hijzen et al. (2005).   6
2.3. 2
nd stage: strategic outsourcing 
In the second stage, the firm maximizes profit with respect to outsourcing activities 
taking into account its implication on the wage setting of the trade union and the 
subsequent on decision on domestic labour input. From 
2 / ) 1 ( 1 5 . 0 ) ( ) 1 ( cM wL M L − − + − δ δ = π
δ − δ − , we obtain the first-order condition 
0 = − − = π cM L w w M M  and thus  
(6)  w cM > . 
Since  0 < M w , it becomes profitable for the firm to increase the outsourcing above the 
level where the marginal outsourcing cost cM  equals the domestic gross wage w. 
Higher outsourcing reaps an additional benefit for the firm in forcing its trade union to 
lower domestic wages. Figure 2 illustrates the reasoning. 













When the firm increases its outsourcing activity from  0 M  to  1 M  in Figure 2, it replaces 
the same amount of domestic workers at the given initial wage  0 w , and it increases the 
production cost by the trapezoid shaded in dark grey. Since this leads the trade union to 
moderate wages in stage 3, it will increase total employment by  ) ( M L d +  and save a 
domestic wage bill equal to the area shaded in light grey. The optimal outsourcing is   7
where the two areas are of equal size (for marginal changes). The strategic component of 
outsourcing in Figure 2 is indicated by 
*
1 M M − . This result can be presented in 
PROPOSITION 1: In the presence of a domestic firm-level trade union, the 
firm will exceed its strategic outsourcing activity beyond the level where 
domestic and foreign marginal labor costs are the same. 
3. Increased international integration 
In the following, we are interested in how domestic labour market policies are affected 
when the possibilities to outsource part of the workforce increase due to increased 
economic integration that lowers the outsourcing cost parameter c. A lower c indicates 
a higher degree of international integration. It has a positive effect on outsourcing, 
0 < c M , which in turn moderates domestic wages because  0 > = c MM w dc dw : a trade 
union in a firm that can engage in outsourcing will moderate wages to alleviate the 
consequences of increased economic integration. By contrast, the effect on domestic 
labour is not as clear-cut as might be expected: 
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M w . 
When c falls, we have the direct effect of substituting foreign labour for domestic labour. 
This effect is counteracted by the indirect wage moderating effect. As it turns out, the 
indirect effect may be stronger as long as the share of outsourcing is small in the sense 
that  5 . ) 1 (
1 < + δ < α
− . At  0 = = α M , we have a strong effect of outsourcing on wage   8
moderation, which in turn has a large effect on domestic labour because of the initially 
high employment level. As the share of outsourcing increases, the wage moderating 
effect decreases, i.e.  0 > MM w  as well as the impact of wage moderation on domestic 
employment, i.e.  0 > ww L . At 
1 ) 1 (
− + δ = α  when  M L δ = , direct and indirect effect are of 
equal size so that in this special case, a further increase in international integration would 
not affect domestic employment but a further economic integration would then have 
unambiguously adverse effects on domestic employment in outsourcing firms. 
PROPOSITION 2: Increasing economic integration that leads to a fall in 
the outsourcing cost parameter c will moderate domestic wages set by the 
union and increase domestic employment in unionized firms that engage in 
outsourcing as long as the outsourcing share does not exceed the critical 
value 
1 ) 1 (
− + δ . 
4. Effects of labour tax policy 
With the results from the two previous sections, we can start analyzing the impact which 
labour tax policy has on domestic employment in firms that can outsource a part of its 
labor activity. Tax policy instruments affect domestic labour costs and the wage 
formation directly. Moreover, it is important to emphasize that tax policy instruments 
affect the domestic workforce indirectly via the strategic outsourcing options of the 
outsourcing firm in stage 3 and therefore the total employment via the induced wage rate 
change and the direct replacement of domestic workers by foreign workers. 
  For the strategic outsourcing decisions of the firm, it is straightforward to 
calculate the following qualitative results (see Appendix 1). First, we have 
0 > π π − = MM Mt t M . In the case of tax exemption, we have  0 < π π − = MM Ma a M . A 
higher wage tax increases outsourcing while a higher tax exemption for workers lowers 
outsourcing activities. A more general unemployment benefit system, by contrast, makes   9
the domestic trade union more demanding thus increasing outsourcing 
0 > π π − = MM Mb b M . All these effects work via their effect on domestic gross wages. If 
the domestic gross wage rises (decreases), then outsourcing activities cet. par. rise 
(decrease). Increases in the domestic wage tax or the unemployment benefit payments 
increase outsourcing because the domestic wage rises, while increases in the wage tax 
exemption decreases outsourcing because it decreases the domestic wage. 
4.1 How single tax instruments can work on wage formation and employment 
With these partial derivatives we can now derive the total effects the tax policy 
instruments have on the wage setting by monopolistic trade unions. The total effect 
consists of the direct wage effect and on the indirect effect via the impact these 
instruments have on the strategic outsourcing decision of firms and thereby also on the 
wage rate. For a change in the wage tax rate we obtain, 











M t t M t 3 2 1 , 
where  1 < A  (see Appendix 1 for details). In the presence of outsourcing the total effect 
of a wage rate change on the wage setting becomes smaller as we have  0 < t MM w . A 
wage increase due to an increase in the wage tax makes outsourcing more attractive. This 
in turn reduces the impact the tax rate has on wage setting and lowers the benefits of a 
wage increase for the trade union. Analogously, the effect of changes in the tax 
exemption and unemployment benefit payments are moderated by the same factor 
) 1 ( A −  so that we have 
{ 0 ) 1 ( < − = + =
+ −
A w M w w
da
dw
a a M a 3 2 1  and  { 0 ) 1 ( > − = + =
− +
A w M w w
db
dw
b b M b 3 2 1 . 
Now we can determine the total effects of the wage tax and tax exemption both via the 
wage effect and via the outsourcing effect on domestic employment. Using (7), we 
obtain    10
(10)  {
{
{{ [] 0 1
1











From the first equation we can unambiguously sign the employment effect of a wage tax 
increase. Employment falls when the wage tax rises. The second equation decomposes 
the effect into the employment effect for a given amount of outsourcing activity M and 
the effect of a change in the strategic outsourcing. Using equation (8)), we obtain 

































as a condition for the direct effect of outsourcing. As long as the share of outsourcing in 
the workforce is relatively small,  5 . ) 1 (
1 < + δ < α
− , the induced outsourcing leads cet. 
par. to an increase of domestic labour because, as explained above, the indirect effect via 
the change in the wage elasticity is stronger as long as the share of outsourcing is small. 
If the degree of outsourcing relative to domestic labour demand is high enough then the 
impact of a tax reform will become stronger for any given η. This is always the case 
when more than 50 percent of the workforce is working abroad. An analogous argument 
can be made for the case when the tax exemption or the unemployment benefits changes. 
Using equation (7) we have 
[] 0 1 > − + = M w a a w w L M w L
da
dL




Employment increases when the tax exemption rises (unemployment benefits fall). In 
addition, domestic employment is substituted for outsourced labour. The second equation 
isolates the strategic outsourcing component and it becomes obvious that the magnitude 

































To determine how a marginal change in the tax policy measures has an effect on 
employment in terms of outsourcing costs, we have to calculate  dtdc L d
2 ,  dtda L d
2    11
and  dbdc L d
2 . Formal details are shown in Appendix 1. Here it turns out that we have 
no unambiguous result. When outsourcing just becomes attractive for the firm, i.e. at 
0 = = α M , a marginal reduction of the outsourcing costs that makes outsourcing 





















because in this case we have a strong effect of outsourcing on wage moderation, which in 
turn has a large effect on domestic labour because of the initially high employment level. A 
sufficient (but not necessary) condition for a reduced impact of marginal tax policy changes 
is that outsourcing is sufficiently important in the sense that
1 ) 1 (
− + δ > α . We thus have a 
non-monotonic impact of strategic outsourcing on the efficacy of tax policy changes. These 
results can be summarized in 
PROPOSITION 3: In the presence of strategic outsourcing, the qualitative 
effects of domestic labour market policies on domestic labour demand are the 
same as in the absence of outsourcing.  If the share of outsourcing is 
sufficiently close to zero, the impact of domestic labour market policy 
changes on domestic employment in outsourcing firms increases while, when 
outsourcing activities are sufficiently large, the impact becomes smaller 
when economic integration increases. 
4.2 Increasing the degree of tax progression 
It is often argued that increasing tax progression is good for employment. In this section, 
we reanalyze this question in the presence of outsourcing by looking at a tax reform that 
increases the degree of tax progression while keeping the average tax burden per worker 





t = −  
to be constant. An appropriate and intuitive way to define tax progression is to look at 
the average tax rate progression (ARP), which is given by the difference between the 
marginal tax rate t and the average tax rate t
a, 
a t t ARP − ≡ . The tax system is 
progressive if ARP is positive, and tax progression is increased if the difference increases 
(at a given income level, see Lambert 2001, chapters 7 and 8). The government can raise 
the degree of tax progression when it increases the wage tax and adjusts the tax 
exemption upwards such that the average tax burden remains constant. Formally we 





























































First we analyze the total wage effects of this tax reform. If we raise tax progression 
according to (13), we have  [ ] da w dt w A dw a t + − = ) 1 ( . Dividing by da and substituting 
the RHS of (12) for  dt da/  gives (see Appendix 2): 
(14)  0


































A higher degree of tax progression, keeping the relative tax burden per worker constant, 
will decrease the wage rate both in the presence and in the absence of outsourcing, but 
the wage rate change is smaller in the case of outsourcing because  1 0 < < A .  
  Finally, we characterize the employment effects of this tax reform. If we raise tax 
progression according to (13), we have, using equations (9) and (10),  
(15) 
[] [ ]
[] [ ] . ) 1 (
) 1 ( ) 1 (
da M dt M da w dt w A L
da M L A w L dt M L A w L dL
a t a t w
a M a w t M t w
+ − + − =
+ − + + − =
   13
The first term indicates the effect the wage rate change has on domestic employment, the 
second term indicates the induced outsourcing (recall that we have  1 − = M L ). Dividing 
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The wage moderating effect increases domestic labor demand, given the level of 
outsourcing. This effect is represented by the first term. Wage moderation, in addition, 
also makes it attractive to lower the outsourcing activities and replace outsourced labor 
by domestic labor. Hence both effects work into the same direction so that tax 
progression remains good for employment when firms have the opportunity to outsource 
their workforces. Hence, raising tax progression according to (16) is good for 
employment.  
PROPOSITION 4: In the presence of strategic outsourcing, increasing the 
degree of tax progression increases domestic employment. 
5. Flexible outsourcing 
So far we have focused on the case where the firm writes long-term contracts that fix the 
amount of outsourcing before the trade union sets the wage. Alternatively, the firm may 
be flexible enough to decide upon the amount of outsourcing activity only after the wage 
is set by the trade union.
9 The time sequence for this case is described by Figure 3. 
                                                 
9  See Skaksen (2004) and Braun and Scheffel (2007) who assume that the trade union sets the wage before 
the firm decides on the degree of outsourcing and the level of production.   14
Figure 3: Time sequence of decisions: flexible outsourcing 
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Flexibility implies that the strategic outsourcing aspect disappears. Thus, all equilibrium 
values of w, L, and M differ and this makes it difficult to compare the two equilibrium 
outcomes directly. We therefore focus on the question to what extent the change in the 
time sequence affects our qualitative results. In the last stage, the firm maximizes profits 
with respect to L and M . This leads to two standard results. Total employment is set 
where marginal productivity equals the wage rate. This leads to a demand function 
similar to equation (2), i.e. we have 
δ − = + w M L . Since outsourcing is decided after the 
wage is set, outsourcing has no effect on the wage setting anymore. The profit 
maximizing outsourcing is thus given by  
(17)  w cM = , 
instead of condition (6) that applies for the case of strategic outsourcing. As a 
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where ) /( L M M + = α . In the second stage the trade union set the wage taking into 
account the labour demand function as defined by 
c
w
w L − =
δ − . Using (18) we obtain 
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As before, we start looking at the impact an increase in international integration ( 0 < dc ) 































As in the case with strategic outsourcing, an increase of economic integration has a 
positive effect on domestic employment when the share of the outsourced workforce is 
small but when the share increases it becomes eventually negative. Qualitatively, the 
results are rather similar to the case of strategic outsourcing but the maximum domestic 
employment levels differ. At the outsourcing share where domestic employment reaches 
its maximum (i.e. at 
1 ) 1 (
− δ + = α ) with strategic outsourcing, domestic employment 
continues to rise as c falls in the case of flexible outsourcing. 
  The analysis of changes in the wage tax, the tax exemption and unemployment 
benefit payments consequently yields similar qualitative results in the case of flexible 
outsourcing. The derivatives simplify as we do not have to take into account the 















































with  [ ] 0 1 > η η + − η = Δ
fo fo
w
fo fo w . Hence the signs of the impact labour market 
instruments have on employment do not change in the presence of flexible outsourcing. 
This can be summarized in  
PROPOSITION 5: In the presence of flexible outsourcing, the qualitative 
effects of domestic labour market policies on labour are the same as in the 
absence of outsourcing but lower in absolute terms.   16
The analysis of the tax reform that keeps the relative tax burden per worker constant 






















































































a t . The increase in tax progression 



























In qualitative terms, these results for the tax reform are the same as in the case of 
strategic outsourcing. This can be summarized as 
PROPOSITION 6:  Irrespective of whether the firm determines 
outsourcing before or after the wage is set, increasing the degree of tax 
progression is always good for employment. 
6. A numerical illustration 
The analytics has shown that, initially, an increase in economic integration followed by 
an increased outsourcing share has a positive effect on domestic employment because the 
possibility to outsource moderates wages and this wage moderation effect outweighs the   17
negative impact of outsourcing on domestic employment. The analytics, however, does 
not allow us to say much about the difference between the two scenarios of strategic and 
flexible outsourcing. We therefore conducted a numerical simulation of the two equation 
systems ((7) in the case of strategic outsourcing and A(18), Appendix 4, in the case of 
flexible outsourcing) for the following parameter values,  8 . = b  and  3 = δ , the latter 
providing a cost share of labour equal to 2/3. 
  In Figure 4 the blue line illustrates how domestic employment and the outsourcing 
share in the case of strategic outsourcing (so) depends on the outsourcing cost parameter c. 
The red lines illustrate respective values for the case of flexible outsourcing ( fo ). As our 
analytical results have shown, the qualitative results are the same: domestic employment 
first rises when economic integration increases (c falls) and only eventually falls when c 
becomes very small. The maximum domestic output level is reached at lower levels of c 
when outsourcing is flexible, and so is the absolute level of domestic labour input. The 
reason is that the impact of flexible outsourcing on labour demand elasticity is stronger than 
in the case of strategic outsourcing because in the predetermined case, making domestic 
labour demand more elastic is more costly as the firm has to raise M above marginal cost. 


















   18
If outsourcing were impossible our numerical simulation model would give us a mark-up 
of 50% so that the wage rate would be  2 . 1 =
+∞ → c w  and  58 . 0 =
+∞ → c L . In Figure 4, the 
horizontal black line indicates this employment level. It turns out that even for high 
values of c and thus a small outsourcing share α, the wage moderating effect is 
substantial and so is the effect on domestic employment. For  1 . = α , the wage 
moderation effect is 6.0% in the case of strategic outsourcing, which results in 8.5% 
more domestic employment. The respective figures for strategic outsourcing are 4.8% 
and 4.2%. Only when c becomes sufficiently small, domestic employment eventually 
falls. In the case of flexible outsourcing, the domestic employment level is higher for all 
b c ⋅ > 6 . 1  or  57 . < α . In the case of strategic outsourcing, this is the case at  b c 3 >  and 
44 . < α . These figures, although meant for illustrative purposes only, indicate that in 
unionized firms outsourcing can have a very strong disciplinary effect on unions that 
benefit domestic employment. Simulations on the magnitude of tax policy changes 
indicate that increased economic integration reduces the impact of labour market policy 
measures in the whole range under consideration so that these result are not reported 
here. 
7. Conclusions 
In this paper we have studied  the outsourcing decisions of unionized firms for two 
different scenarios. In the first scenario the firm writes long-term contracts that fix the 
amount of outsourcing before the trade union sets the wage. In the second scenario, the 
firm is flexible enough to decide upon the amount of outsourcing activity simultaneously 
with domestic labour demand decision only after the wage is set by the trade union. We 
have shown that in both cases outsourcing leads to wage moderation, which is stronger in 
the case of flexible outsourcing because the outsourcing decision makes the domestic 
labour demand even more elastic. With long-term contracts the firm will outsource in   19
order to force trade unions to moderate wages to compensate for domestic labour 
payment.  
  It turns out that as long as the share of the outsourced workforce is not too large, 
the induced wage-moderation effect on domestic employment outweighs the direct 
substitution effect:  domestic employment increases in unionized firms within a wide 
interval of outsourcing costs when outsourcing costs fall so that international economic 
integration increases. Within our framework we could identify an upper boundary for the 
outsourcing share. As long as the outsourcing share does not exceed 
1 ) 1 (
− − δ , where δ  
indicates the total labour demand elasticity, domestic labour increases with outsourcing 
in unionized firms. 
  With respect to the impact of labour tax reforms on such firms, the qualitative 
effects of changes in the wage tax rate, the tax exemption and the unemployment benefit 
payments are the same as in the absence of outsourcing. Furthermore, increasing the 
degree of tax progression by keeping the relative tax burden per worker constant 
continues to be good for employment.  Except for very small outsourcing activities, 
however, the impact of these policy measures on outsourcing unionized firms’ domestic 
employment are diminished when outsourcing costs fall.  
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Appendix 1: wage setting, optimal strategic outsourcing and domestic employment 
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The first-order condition for optimal strategic outsourcing can be expressed, by using 
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The differentiation of  M π  with respect to domestic wage tax t, tax exemption a and 
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Concerning the precise effects of parameters we have in terms of wage tax  
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0 = M , we obtain  ( ) 0 ) 1 (
2 < − δ − L Mt  so  that at least for a very small share of 
outsourcing, tax policy will affect labor demand more when economic integration 
increases ( 0 < dc ). 
Appendix 2: effect of higher tax progression on wage formation under strategic 
outsourcing  























= ) 1 ( 1





















which gives (14), where the denominator is positive. Concerning  a t w t a w w
1 ) (
− − +  in 







2 ) 1 (
) ( 1
) 1 (
) 1 )( (
2 ) 1 (











− − − −


















   24
Appendix 3: effect of higher tax progression on domestic employment under 
strategic outsourcing  
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so that we obtain 
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which can be expressed as (16). 
Appendix 4: wage formation and domestic employment under flexible outsourcing 
Equation (19) gives us a function  ) , , , ( t c b a w . We then have the comparative statics for dc 
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Substituting in  0 = α  and  1 = α  yields the first two conditions of (20). Furthermore it is 
straightforward to show that  0
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